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ABSTRACT 
 
 
One dominant argument against environmental regulations is that the regulations will 
increase costs to facilities, causing the facilities to lay-off their workers. However, there are 
several ways facilities can respond to regulatory and community pressures to increase 
environmental performance. The facility could reduce its emissions of toxic chemicals by 
preventing pollution at the beginning of the process, controlling pollution by recycling or treating 
chemicals, or controlling pollution using end of pipe techniques. Furthermore, these responses 
can affect employment in different ways, depending on whether abatement activities require 
more or less labor and their effect on the scale of output. The purpose of this study is to examine 
the impact of facilities’ voluntary reductions in toxic emissions on their level of employment by 
estimating the level pollution control and employment as a simultaneous decision made by 
facilities. I compare the different methods facilities use to reduce their emissions and how these 
methods affect facility-level employment. I apply a 3SLS model to panel data from the EPA’s 
Toxic Release Inventory and a unique facility-level dataset, which includes facility-level 
characteristic data on over 10,000 establishments across the United States over 15 years, from 
1995 to 2011. My results show that reductions in toxic releases had a statistically significant 
negative impact on employment. However, if the facility reduces emissions using prevent 
pollution methods through reducing emissions per unit of sales, then the facility will reduce less 
employment than if the facility reduced pollution using end of pipe pollution control methods. 
These effects are similar if the facility is reducing regulated emission as well as non-regulated 
emissions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Command and control regulations are prevalent environmental policies, because they are 
relatively easy to implement and enforce; however, they tend to be more costly for firms than 
other types of regulations. Critics have argued that command and control regulations have 
adverse effects on employment, because they can be expected to increase costs for firms and lead 
the firms to lay-off their workers. However, empirical evidence on this effect has been mixed 
(which I will discuss in the next section). Recently, policy makers have implemented mandatory 
information disclosure policies to provide incentives for firms to voluntarily increase their 
environmental performance and allow the firms to utilize more flexible abatement techniques. 
Several studies have examined how firms respond to these regulations and what factors or 
pressures influence firm responsiveness. Voluntary approaches to pollution control are only 
likely to be undertaken if they are in the interest of the firm; thus, their impact on the firms’ costs 
and employment may be different from that of command and control regulations. The purpose of 
this paper is to analyze the impact of facilities’ voluntary reductions in pollution discharges—
through mandatory information disclosure—on their level of employment.  
Over the past two decades, the EPA has used information disclosure of toxic releases as a 
policy instrument to complement command and control regulations and provide incentives for 
facilities to voluntarily reduce their toxic releases. The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)—which 
was established by the EPA in 1987—requires facilities that have more than ten full-time 
employees and produce or use chemicals above a threshold level to report their toxic emissions. 
The EPA then publically discloses the amount of reported chemicals. Most of these toxic 
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chemicals are not directly regulated by environmental regulations. However, previous studies 
show that a facility’s public disclosure of TRI releases can lead to pressures from regulators, 
investors, consumers and other stakeholders to reduce emissions (Khanna 2001; Doshi et al. 
2013).  
Previous studies have analyzed the effects of command and control regulations on 
employment; however, these analyses might have overestimated the costs of regulations to 
facilities, since command and control regulations tend to be more costly than other regulations, 
which allow for more flexibility in the abatement techniques. My analysis extends previous 
studies by examining how voluntary pollution control affects employment.  
This analysis also differs from previous studies by examining why facilities might reduce 
their pollution, the methods that the facilities might use to reduce their emissions, and how these 
methods affect employment. I incorporate internal facility-level characteristics as well as 
external pressures that facilities might face, which could lead them to reduce their emissions. I 
examine the levels of toxic emissions discharged, emissions per unit of sales, and waste 
management techniques to determine whether facilities reduce their emissions by controlling 
pollution at the end of the production process, preventing pollution at the source by increasing 
efficiency, or controlling pollution by recycling chemicals or treating the releases on and offsite. 
Some of these techniques for reducing pollution might be less costly to the facilities than others; 
therefore I analyze how each of these activities affects the facilities’ employment. Lastly, I 
compare regulated chemical emissions and non-regulated emissions in order to see if reductions 
in emissions regulated by the Clean Air Act (CAA) have a different impact on a facility’s 
employment than emissions that are not regulated. 
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I conduct this research by using a panel data set of 10,824 facilities that reported to the 
TRI during the 1995-2011 period. I use the facilities’ level of discharges of toxic chemicals and 
their waste management levels as measures of their environmental performance, and I use a 3-
stage least squares model to allow facilities’ levels of pollution control and employment to be 
simultaneously determined. Lastly, in order to identify the system of equations, I use the level of 
pollution emitted by the sibling facilities as an instrumental variable, which determines a 
facility’s pollution, but is not expected to affect its employment. 
My overall results show that improvements in environmental performance through 
reductions in toxic releases lead to a statistically significant reduction in employment. A 
reduction in pollution intensity through a reduction in emissions per unit of sales also decreases 
employment; however, for a given reduction in emissions, a reduction in pollution by using 
pollution prevention techniques reduces employment less than reducing pollution through end-
of-pipe methods. If the facilities choose to reduce pollution by increasing waste management, 
then they tend to reduce their employment.  Lastly, facilities that reduce their regulated toxic 
emissions and regulated emissions per unit of sales tend to reduce employment; however, 
reducing emissions through increasing efficiency results in less adverse effects on employment. 
These effects of reducing regulated emissions on employment are very similar to the 
employment effects of reducing regulated and non-regulated emissions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
Several studies have examined motivating factors that lead facilities to voluntarily reduce 
their toxic releases. These studies have shown that even though toxic emissions are not directly 
regulated through the TRI, public disclosure of toxic emissions can increase stakeholders’ 
awareness of high-emitting facilities, which can lead to different pressures for the facilities to 
reduce their chemical releases (Bi and Khanna 2012). Arora and Cason (1998) and Bi and 
Khanna (2012) found that facilities’ community characteristics such as household income had a 
significant effect on facilities’ toxic releases. Other studies have found facilities that participate 
in voluntary pollution prevention programs (Bi and Khanna 2012; Harrington et al. 2014) or 
have active environmental management systems (Anton et al. 2004) are more likely to reduce 
their toxic emissions. Lastly, Doshi et al. (2013) found that facility characteristics such as private 
ownership and proximity to headquarters significantly reduced toxic releases. 
Another body of literature examined the positive outcomes of reducing toxic releases in 
order to further understand why facilities voluntarily improve their environmental performance. 
Studies have found that facilities that reduce their toxic emissions have fewer inspections (Innes 
and Sam 2008) and are monitored for compliance less frequently (Maxwell and Decker 2006). 
These studies show that facilities are not only pressured to reduce their emissions, but they also 
might choose to voluntarily abate their pollution discharges because they can benefit from better 
relations with regulators. 
One study analyzed the negative outcomes of reducing toxic releases by comparing toxic 
emissions of manufacturing facilities that shut down and facilities that continued operations 
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(Kassinis and Vafeas 2009). Kassinis and Vafeas (2009) found that facilities that had shut down 
tended to reduce their emissions more—prior to going out of business—than facilities that 
continued operations. Studies have examined the impacts of toxic releases on number of 
inspections, frequency of monitoring, and facilities shutting down; however, as far as I am 
aware, there have been no studies that analyzed how toxic releases affect employment. 
Several studies have sought to measure the effects of command and control regulations 
on changes in employment (Berman and Bui 2001; Morgenstern et al. 2002; Walker 2011; 
Golombek and Raknerud 1997; Cole and Elliot 2007). However, these empirical studies have 
shown mixed results. Early studies such as Golombek and Raknerud (1997) and Morgenstern et 
al. (2002) examined only three or four industries and found overall insignificant effects of 
environmental performance and regulations on employment. Golombek and Raknerud (1997) 
looked at the correlation between Norwegian environmental regulations and employment. They 
found that there were no significant effects in the chemical industries; however, in the iron and 
steel industry and the pulp and paper industry, they found a significantly positive correlation 
between higher employment and stricter environmental regulations. Morgenstern et al. (2002) 
used industry-level data to examine how firms’ environmental spending affects the change in 
employment, and they found small and insignificant affects. However, Morgenstern et al. (2002) 
did not treat environmental spending as endogenous; therefore, there might be endogeneity bias 
and it could be difficult to infer causality. 
Later studies analyzed the effects of command and control regulations on employment, 
while aiming to control for the endogeneity of firms’ environmental performance and labor in 
several different ways; however, the results were also inconclusive. Berman and Bui (2001) 
analyzed how local regulations around the Los Angeles area affect employment at manufacturing 
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plants. They controlled for the possible endogeneity of regulations by selecting comparison 
groups from counties in Louisiana and Texas and counties surrounding the LA area that were 
comprised of facilities in similar industries but had no local regulations. Although there was a 
large decrease in employment during the sample period, Berman and Bui (2001) did not find 
significant evidence that local environmental regulations were the cause of the labor reduction. 
Instead, Berman and Bui (2001) found that the local regulations might have resulted in a small 
increase in employment. The unexpected results could be attributed to the limited number of 
industries included in the study. That is, since Berman and Bui (2001) are only analyzing the 
manufacturing industry, the local regulations that apply to the facility also apply to all of its 
competitors; as a result, the demand for the facility’s goods might not be affected.  Next, Walker 
(2011) analyzed how environmental regulation—measured by county attainment status—
affected the employment growth rate in facilities across the United States, and used a change in 
the requirements of the CAA as an exogenous shock. Walker (2011) found that facilities located 
in counties that had switched their regulatory status from attainment to non-attainment—which 
leads to stricter air pollution regulations—had a significantly lower employment growth rate. 
However, since the shock occurred to all counties across the U.S. and there was no variation in 
the change in regulation, it is difficult to tease out the changes in county attainment status 
associated with the amendment to the CAA. Lastly, Cole and Elliot (2007) used a three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) model to estimate industry-level abatement expenditure and employment 
simultaneously. They found that abatement expenditure had no significant effect on employment 
for industries in the UK. However, these results could be due to the small sample size; the data 
was comprised of only 27 industries over 5 years. 
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 Studies that analyze the effects of command and control regulation on firm location have 
also shown mixed results (for a review of some of these studies, see Jeppesen and Folmer 2001). 
It is important to consider these analyses when examining employment effects on regulations, 
because if a firm chooses to relocate due to increased regulations, employment in the area would 
change. Early studies found that environmental regulations do not significantly affect the 
location of new firms (Bartik 1988; McConnell and Schwab 1990; Levinson 1996). However, 
these studies did not control for endogeneity between regulations and firm location. List et al. 
(2003) extended previous studies by comparing results from a parametric model and a propensity 
score matching model, which controlled for endogeneity. When List et al. (2003) used the 
parametric model and did not control for endogeneity, the results were insignificant; in contrast, 
List et al. (2003) found that in the propensity score matching model, new firms were 
significantly less likely to locate to non-attainment counties. These results from List et al. (2003) 
highlight the importance of controlling for endogeneity. 
In this study, I control for the endogeneity of toxic emissions using a 3SLS model similar 
to Cole and Elliot (2007). This analysis extends Cole and Elliot (2007) and other previous studies 
in several ways. First, I utilize a large facility-level data set that includes over 10,000 facilities in 
61 industries over a 17-year time period. This allows me to conduct detailed analysis on the 
change in facility-level employment. 
In addition to the unique data set, the analysis differs from previous studies by using 
multiple measures for voluntary environmental performance and regulatory stringency. Previous 
studies have focused on analyzing plant- or industry-specific responses to command and control 
regulations. These regulations require facilities to install end-of-pipe controls such as smoke 
stacks or scrubbers. Since these methods catch pollution after it is generated and do not alter the 
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facilities’ production process, they often impose costs on facilities. In contrast, facilities that 
adopt voluntary environmental management have a greater flexibility in choosing their methods 
for reducing pollution, and the facilities will only choose the abatement methods that have the 
potential to increase their profits. Therefore, we anticipate that the effects of voluntary 
environmental performance on facilities’ employment will be different than the effects of 
command and control regulations. I use amount toxic chemical discharges a proxy for voluntary 
environmental performance, and I use waste management and toxic emissions per unit of sales to 
analyze the effects of different methods of pollution control. I also include variables for the 
stringency of enforcement of command and control regulations to control for spillover effects on 
facilities’ voluntary environmental performance. Lastly, I compare facility-specific responses to 
voluntary environmental management and command and control regulations by analyzing 
whether reductions in regulated emissions have a different affect on employment than un-
regulated emissions. 
Finally, I extend previous literature by controlling for external pressures such as 
community and headquarter pressures. As mentioned above, Doshi et al. (2013) and Arora and 
Cason (1998) found that facilities change their toxic emissions in response to community 
characteristics and pressures. Similarly, Kassinis and Vafeas (2009) and Greenwood et al. (2010) 
found that facilities change their employment or shut down in response to external pressures such 
as populations with higher income or proximity headquarters. Greenwood et al. (2010) explained 
that facilities that are located near their headquarters face greater community pressures, because 
they are more likely to receive negative media attention, if they do not perform in a socially 
responsible manner. Therefore, we expect that facilities might respond to these external pressures 
by changing their employment.  
  9 
CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 We consider a profit maximizing, polluting facility whose level of labor and pollution 
discharges are determined simultaneously. The facility could choose to produce or use more 
chemicals than the TRI threshold level and thus would be required to report its toxic emissions to 
the EPA. The EPA publically discloses the facility’s level of emissions and waste management 
activities. However, the EPA does not require the facility to reduce its emissions, so any 
reductions in emissions are due to the facility’s voluntary abatement activities. Since reductions 
are voluntary, they must be beneficial to the facility and increase the facility’s profits—or have 
the potential to increase profits either by reducing costs, increasing demand (market share) or 
allowing facility to charge a higher price. 
Studies have found that public disclosure of toxic emissions can lead to several external 
pressures for facilities to reduce their chemical releases, even though the emissions might not be 
directly regulated (Doshi et al. 2013; for a review, see Khanna 2001). First, indirect regulatory 
pressures might influence a facility to improve its environmental performance. The facility might 
increase its abatement activities in order to preempt future regulations or avoid liability threats 
(Anton et al. 2004; Khanna and Damon 1999). The facility might reduce emissions to be on good 
standing with regulators in hopes that regulators will be more relaxed with future inspections and 
regulations. Also, the facility might reduce toxic emissions due to spillover effects from other 
environmental regulations. Next, the facility might face pressures from its investors, consumers, 
and the surrounding community to participate in environmental management (Arora and Cason 
1996; Sam, Khanna, and Innes 2009). If the facility reduces emissions, it could benefit from 
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greater reputational benefits and better relationship with its investors or community. Lastly, the 
facility might be motivated to reduce its emissions due to its internal characteristics. Facility 
characteristics could lead to a reduction in the cost of abatement or provide easier access to 
cleaner technology. Some of these characteristics that could lead to better environmental 
performance include: facility size, financial stability, relations with headquarters, and past 
environmental performance (Khanna 2001; Doshi et al. 2013). 
Voluntary abatement activities allow for more flexibility in the abatement techniques 
compared to command and control regulations—which focus on controlling pollution at the end 
of the production process—and they are likely to result in less financial burden to the facility. 
Therefore, the facility could respond to external pressures in several ways. First, the facility 
could reduce its emissions of toxic chemicals by reducing production levels or output. Second, 
the facility could control pollution at the end of the process by installing smoke stacks or 
scrubbers. Third, the facility could control the pollution before it is generated through pollution 
prevention. It could prevent pollution by changing the production process, increasing efficiency, 
or substitute use of other non-toxic chemical inputs. Lastly, the facility could abate using waste 
management techniques by recycling the chemicals or treating the chemical waste after the waste 
is generated. 
These pollution abatement efforts could directly or indirectly increase or decrease 
employment, depending on whether abatement activities require more or less labor and their 
effects on the facilities’ output (Berman and Bui 2001; Morgenstern et al. 2002). First, the 
facility could directly decrease or increase employment by substituting pollution for another 
input. We consider the facility has three inputs: labor, capital, and pollution. In order to decrease 
pollution, the facility could increase employment, if labor and pollution are substitutes. On the 
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other hand, if labor and pollution are complements, then the facility could increase its capital in 
order to decrease pollution and labor. Therefore, this direct effect of substituting pollution for 
other inputs has an ambiguous effect on facilities’ employment. Next, a reduction in pollution 
could indirectly affect the facility’s employment through a change in its output from either a 
change in the demand or a change in the supply. When the facility reduces its pollution, the 
facility could differentiate its product as an environmentally friendly good, which could increase 
its demand; this would increase output and increase labor. Lastly, when the facility reduces its 
pollution, its costs could also decrease due to reduced liabilities or fines. If the facility’s costs 
decrease, then the facility could increase its employment. Overall, the expected net impact of 
environmental performance on employment is ambiguous. 
As mentioned earlier, the profit maximizing facility chooses the quantity of pollution 
control and employment based on its firm characteristics and the external pressures it faces, but 
also the facility’s decision of one quantity will affect its decisions of the other quantity. This 
means that the level of pollution is endogenous. I control for this endogeneity bias by estimating 
two equations simultaneously. In one equation, I examine the extent to which regulatory 
pressures, community pressures, and firm characteristics determine whether or not a facility 
reports to the TRI and the level of its TRI emissions. In the second equation, I examine the extent 
to which TRI emissions affected employment. I will explain these two equations in the next 
section. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In order allow emissions and employment to be determined simultaneously, I implement 
a three-stage least squares (3SLS) model similar to that used in Cole and Elliot (2007). I estimate 
the reduced form equation of pollution control and the structural model of the employment as: 
 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁!" = 𝛼!𝑋!!" + 𝜃!𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆!"!! + 𝛿!𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑆!"!! + 𝛼!𝑍! + 𝛼!𝑑! + 𝛼!𝜆!" + 𝜀!!"  [1] 
 𝐸𝑀𝑃!" = 𝛽!𝑋!!" + 𝜃!𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆!"!! + 𝛾!𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁!" + 𝜌!𝑇𝑅𝐼 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇!" + 𝛿!𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑆!"!!+ 𝛽!𝑍! + 𝛽!𝑑! + 𝜀!!" [2] 
where EMPit is the level of employment for ith facility at time t, and POLLUTIONit is the 
amount of reported pollution or pollution control for ith facility at time t. I use several different 
measures for POLLUTIONit, including: amount of toxic releases, amount of waste management, 
toxic releases per unit of sales, amount of toxic releases that are regulated by the CAA, and CAA 
regulated releases per unit of sales. In addition to analyzing how reductions in pollution affects 
employment, these measures allow us to study how different pollution control methods affect 
employment.  
The variable SALESit-1 is the level of output produced, measured in level of sales, for 
facility i at time t-1. REGSit-1 is a vector of measures of regulations and regulation outcomes, for 
facility i at time t-1. These measures include whether the facility was penalized for being out of 
compliance and whether the facility was in a non-attainment county. Since I expect SALES and 
REGS to be endogenous, I use the lagged values of facility i.  
I use X1it and X2it to represent vectors of exogenous facility-specific variables that affect 
POLLUTIONit and EMPit, respectively. The factors that affect POLLUTIONit, which we will 
  13 
discuss later, include: ownership of the firm, headquarter location, unemployment rate and 
household income in the area around the facility, whether the facility produces final goods, and 
the environmental voting record in the state where the facility is located. The variables that affect 
EMPit include: ownership of the firm, headquarter location, and unemployment rate and 
household income in the area around the facility. I utilize industry-level fixed effects, where Zt 
represents year dummies to capture time trend, and di represents time-invariant industry 
dummies generated from the 4-digit SIC code. 
 I represent the random error terms for equation [1] and [2] as 𝜀!!" and 𝜀!!", respectively. 
Since I anticipate that facilities choose their level of employment and pollution simultaneously, I 
assume the error term of equation [1] is correlated with POLLUTIONit. In order to correct for 
this, I estimate the simultaneous equations using a 3SLS model. 3SLS requires each equation to 
have at least as many excluded variables as it has endogenous variables. The excluded variables 
must be correlated with the endogenous variable, but not correlated with the error term. Equation 
[2] includes one endogenous variable; therefore, in Equation [1] I use 𝜆!" to represent a facility-
specific variable that is expected to affect facilities’ pollution control, but is not expected to 
affect facilities’ employment. A Facility’s ability to control pollution would depend on the 
technical feasibility and the ability of other facilities in the company to control pollution; 
however, I don’t expect the technical feasibility to reduce emissions to affect the facility’s 
employment, unless the employment is indirectly affected through a change in the facility’s own 
emissions. Therefore, I use the total pollution reduction of sibling facilities to satisfy the 
identification requirement. In order to check the robustness of the siblings’ pollution variable, I 
estimate the models using three other variables: the emissions or waste management methods 
used by sibling facilities per sibling facility, the total amount of pollution reduction of siblings 
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that are in the same industry as the facility, and the pollution reduction of the sibling facilities 
that are in the same industry as the facility per same-industry sibling facility. 
Lastly, as we will discuss later, the data set includes facilities that report to the TRI for 
the entire sample period as well as facilities that have fallen below the TRI reporting threshold 
and thus report their emissions intermittently. In order to control for these missing observations, I 
include a missing data indicator variable, TRI REPORT, which takes the value of 1 if the facility 
reported zero or positive emissions, and 0 otherwise. Allison (2001) explains that this method is 
acceptable to use when the data does not exist. For example, in my case, I am examining 
facilities’ voluntary environmental performance due to public disclosure of their toxic releases. 
The facilities that fall below the reporting threshold are not required to report their emissions; 
therefore, the data on how these facilities respond to public disclosure of emissions does not 
exist. The significance of the coefficient tells us that the missing data are not random. However, 
there is no intuitive meaning behind the value of the coefficient of TRI REPORT. 
Next, I will discuss the external and internal pressures that the polluting facility might 
face that could cause it to voluntarily reduce its emissions and effect its employment. These 
pressures include regulatory pressures, community pressures, and firm characteristics. Table 1 
provides all of the variables that I use and their descriptions. 
 
4.1. Determinants of Toxic Emissions and Pollution Control 
The profit-maximizing, polluting facility could be pressured to reduce its toxic emissions 
by stakeholders in the surrounding community, including: consumers and environmental activists 
(Arora and Cason 1998; Bi and Khanna 2012; Sam et al. 2002; Harrington et al.2008). If the 
polluting facility does not take the community’s concerns under consideration, it could risk a bad 
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reputation, loss of sales, or even liability for damages. As a measure of community pressures, I 
use Income per Capita in the county where the facility is located. Arora and Cason (1998) found 
that facilities in areas with higher per capita income tend to have lower toxic emissions in future 
years. They explain that areas with higher income per capita often have a higher demand for 
environmental quality than areas with lower income per capita. Similarly, Bi and Khanna (2012) 
found that median household income had a significant effect on whether the facility participated 
in the 33/50 program. Therefore, we expect that facilities located in areas with higher income per 
capita will have higher pressures to abate their pollution discharges. 
For another measure of community pressures, I use Final Goods, which is a dummy for 
whether the facility produced final goods or intermediate goods. I create the variable using 4-
digit SIC codes, as classified by Harrington et al. (2008). Harrington et al. (2008) found that 
facilities that produce final goods are more likely to adopt total quality environmental 
management (TQEM). We anticipate that consumer and community pressures have more 
leverage on facilities that produce final goods than facilities that produce intermediate goods, and 
the facilities that produce final goods will show larger increases environmental performance. 
As mentioned above, the EPA does not directly regulate toxic releases through the TRI; 
however, facilities might respond to indirect regulatory pressures to improve relations with 
regulators or to preempt future regulations (Khanna et al. 2009; Khanna 2001). I use a several 
measures to proxy for indirect regulatory pressures. First, I use County Nonattainment Status to 
control for spillover effects within facilities that comply with command and control regulations. 
Bi and Khanna (2012) found that the non-attainment had a significant effect on whether the 
facility participated in the 33/50 program. Therefore, although chemicals included in the TRI are 
not the same chemicals that are monitored for county-attainment status, we expect facilities that 
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are located in nonattainment counties to have larger waste management and greater reductions in 
toxic emissions.  
The second proxy I use for indirect regulatory pressures is regulation outcomes such as 
the Penalties incurred by the facility. Penalties is a dummy variable that measures whether the 
facility is in compliance with air quality regulation, where the value equals 1 if the facility was 
penalized for being out of compliance, and 0 otherwise. Bi and Khanna (2012) found that the 
number of inspections for compliance incurred by the facility had a significantly positive effect 
on whether the facility participated in the 33/50 program. Therefore, we expect that if the facility 
was penalized in prior years, then it will decrease its toxic releases and use more methods of 
pollution control. 
Lastly, I use State LCV Scores—the voting record for environmental bills from the 
League of Conservation Voters (LCV)—as a measure of regulation pressures that indirectly 
affects employment through toxic emissions. Levinson (1996) uses State LCV Scores as a 
component of one of the regulation indices to analyze their effects on firm location. These 
indices include: the Conservation Foundation Index, which was comprised of 19 components 
such as state processes for environmental impact statements and LCV scores; the FREE index or the Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment index, which was constructed using the 
strength of environmental laws in each state; and the Green index, which was the total number of 
statutes in each state. Jeppesen and Folmer (2001) explain that when evaluating the effect of 
regulations on employment, indexes are not an ideal proxy for regulations, because these 
variables do not directly affect the facilities’ costs. Therefore, in my analysis I use State LCV 
Scores—a component of the Conservation Foundation Index—only in determining toxic 
releases, and I expect that this proxy will only indirectly affect employment through toxic 
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releases. Bi and Khanna (2012) use the State LCV Scores to control for political climate while 
analyzing how the EPA’s 33/50 program affects toxic emissions, and they found that it had a 
significantly negative effect on releases. Therefore, we anticipate that facilities located in areas 
with high State LCV Scores will have lower pollution and more pollution control. 
In addition to community and regulatory pressures, firm characteristics play a key role in 
the facility’s ability to reduce its emissions. I use the following variables to evaluate the effects 
of firm- and facility-level characteristics on toxic releases: sales, facility size, unemployment 
rate, whether the facility is publicly or privately owned, whether the facility is located in the 
same city as its corporate headquarters, and the level of pollution reduction from other facilities 
under the same parent firm. We expect that facilities with larger Sales have larger toxic releases. 
However, we also expect facilities with larger Sales have a greater ability to reduce their 
emissions, since they are more financially stable and have more resources to put towards 
improving environmental performance. Therefore, sales and facility size could have a positive or 
negative effect on toxic releases.  
I use county-level Unemployment Rate as a measure of the stability of the surrounding 
economy. Arora and Cason (1998) found that unemployment rate had a significantly negative 
effect on toxic releases. Therefore, we expect that as the county Unemployment Rate increases, 
toxic releases and waste management in facilities will decrease due to the economic downturn.  
I create an indicator variable, Firm Ownership, which takes the value of 1 if the facility is 
publically owned and 0 otherwise. Doshi et al. (2013) found that privately owned facilities have 
lower toxic releases than publically owned facilities; they explained that publically owned 
facilities might be under more pressure to increase financial performance rather than 
environmental performance. However, Doshi et al. (2013) also noted that publically owned 
  18 
facilities might invest in more abatement activities in order to avoid the stock prices decreasing 
due to the facilities’ large disclosures of toxic chemicals. Thus, it is ambiguous whether facilities 
that are publically traded have lower or higher emissions and pollution control.  
Next, I construct the dummy Headquarter Location to take the value of 1 if the facility is 
located in the same city as its headquarters, and 0 otherwise. Doshi et al. (2013) found that 
facilities that are located in the same city as their headquarters demonstrate greater 
environmental performance than those facilities not located in the same city. The authors 
explained that facilities located near headquarters are under more pressure to keep good 
reputations. Therefore, I expect that facilities located near their headquarters would abate more 
pollution.  
Lastly, I expect that a facility’s emissions or pollution control methods will be affected 
by the type of technology and products it is producing; I proxy for these by including Siblings’ 
Pollution. This variable is the total toxic emissions emitted or amount of waste management by 
all of the facility’s sibling facilities—facilities that report to the same headquarters, as indicated 
by the headquarters’ D-U-N-S number. Doshi et al. (2013) found that facilities with a near-by 
sibling facility that was in the same industry demonstrated greater environmental performance. 
Harrington et al (2008) used the percent of sibling facilities that adopt TQEM in order to control 
for peer pressure, and found that it had a significant positive effect on facilities adopting TQEM. 
We expect that facilities with siblings that undertake larger pollution control and have smaller 
amounts of pollution discharges will also have more pollution control and less pollution 
discharges. We expect that the Sibling’s Pollution will affect the facility’s emissions, but not its 
employment. Therefore, I exclude this variable from the employment model. I check the 
robustness of siblings’ pollution by estimating the model with the three other variables. First, I 
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use the Pollution per Sibling, by taking the total amount of pollution emitted by the sibling 
facilities divided the number of siblings or the number of sibling that report to TRI. Second, I use 
Same-Industry Sibling’s Pollution, which is the total amount of pollution reduction from the 
facilities that have the same headquarters as well as the same 4-digit SIC code.  Lastly, I use 
Same-Industry Pollution per Sibling, which is the amount of pollution by the sibling facilities in 
the same industry divided by the number of same-industry sibling facilities. 
After we analyze how external pressures and firm characteristics affect a facility’s 
quantity of toxic emissions, then we will be able to get a deeper understanding how the quantity 
of toxic emissions affect the facility’s employment. Next, we will discuss the factors that might 
affect the polluting facility’s employment. 
 
4.2. Determinants of Employment 
As mentioned earlier, I use multiple measures of proxies for voluntary environmental 
performance in determining employment. First, I use a change in Toxic Emissions as the mirror 
image of abatement. Second, I use Waste Management, which is a measure of abatement 
activities such as: recycling chemicals or materials, treating waste, or energy recovery both on 
and offsite. Third, I use Emissions per Unit of Sales as a measure of efficiency in using toxic 
chemicals. Lastly, I use CAA Regulated Emissions and CAA Regulated Emissions per Unit of 
Sales in order to compare reductions in regulated emissions and voluntary reductions in 
unregulated emissions. Several studies have used firms’ environmental spending or abatement 
costs as a proxy for abatement activities and regulation stringencies in order to analyze firms’ 
responses to command and control regulations (Morgenstern et al. 2002; Cole and Elliot 2007; 
Levinson 1996). However, as mentioned in Section 2, previous results on how abatement 
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activities affect employment are mixed. Since we are analyzing the effects of voluntary pollution 
control, we expect that facilities will respond differently than with command and control 
regulations. 
Levinson (1996) suggested using multiple measures for regulation stringency or 
facilities’ abatement activities, because each proxy could be picking up distinct regulation 
characteristics; therefore, in addition to voluntary abatement activities, I use two other measures 
for regulations and regulation outcomes. First, I use County Nonattainment Status to measure 
whether or not the facility is affected by command and control regulations. As with the effects of 
abatement activities, the results are unclear on how County Nonattainment Status affects 
employment. Walker (2011) and List et al. (2003) found that facilities located in counties that 
had switched their regulatory status from attainment to non-attainment had significantly lower 
employment growth rate and lower new facility birth rate. However, McConnell and Schwab 
(1990) found that it had insignificant effects on new facilities’ location.  
Secondly, I use Penalties as a proxy for regulation outcomes. As stated earlier, Penalties 
is a measure of whether the facility was out of compliance for air regulations in the previous 
year. If the facility was penalized, then its costs would increase, and we would expect that it 
would reduce its employment. However, the facility could increase employment in order to 
increase its environmental performance, if more employment is needed for pollution control. 
Therefore, the effect of Penalties on employment is ambiguous. 
As another determinant of employment, I use Income per Capita to measure community 
pressures and characteristics. Kassinis and Vafeas (2009) state that facilities located in higher 
income areas are more likely to shut down, because they face greater pressures to be socially 
responsible. However, facilities in higher income areas might face more pressure to increase 
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financial performance. Therefore, we expect that facilities located in areas with higher income 
per capita will have higher pressures to reduce their emissions and will have either lower or 
higher employment. 
As with the pollution equation, I use Unemployment Rate as a measure of stability of the 
surrounding economy in determining employment. We expect that as the county unemployment 
rate increases, output would decrease due to a decrease in demand, which would result in a 
decrease in employment—if the facilities had localized demand. However, we also expect that as 
the unemployment rate increases, wages would decrease, and individual facilities would be able 
to hire more employees. Therefore, the effect of a change in unemployment rate on facility-level 
employment is ambiguous. 
Lastly, I control for facility-level characteristics by using Sales, Firm Ownership, and 
Headquarter Location. I expect that facilities with larger Sales will have more employees. Firm 
Ownership could either be positive or negative depending on whether public facilities have more 
or less employees than private facilities. Greenwood et al. (2010) found facilities located near 
their headquarters tended not to destroy as many jobs as facilities that were more spread out in 
order to improve their reputation with the community. However, if facilities that are located near 
their headquarters experience more pressure from the community to be environmentally 
responsible, then the facilities could respond to the increase in cost by reducing employment. 
Since the effects of both Ownership, and Headquarter Location might be ambiguous, I estimate 
the equations with and without these variables and include both models in the results.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
This analysis focuses on U.S. facilities that report to the TRI and have continued their 
operations from 1995 to 2011 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2011a). The EPA requires 
facilities with at least ten full-time employees to report all releases of toxic emissions as well as 
waste management activities, if the facility manufactures more than 25,000 lbs., processes more 
than 25,000 lbs., or uses more than 10,000 lbs. of a specific toxic chemical—from a list of over 
500 chemicals—in one year.  The EPA then publically discloses the reports. In 1995, 2000, 
2001, and 2011, the EPA changed the TRI chemical requirements and the reporting thresholds to 
include more reportable chemicals (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2012b). Therefore, I 
only consider the releases from chemicals whose threshold requirements have remained 
unchanged throughout the sample period.  
I constructed several dependent variables for equation [1] to analyze the effects of 
reductions in pollution or increases in pollution control on employment. First, I used the 
logarithm of the total amount of toxic chemicals released for each facility; these emissions 
include both onsite and offsite chemical releases and disposals in air, water, and land. Second, I 
divided the amount of toxic releases by the amount of annual sales in order to get the emissions 
per unit of sales. Next, I constructed a variable measure waste management; this variable 
includes the amount of treated chemicals, chemicals and materials that were recycled, or 
recovered energy on and offsite by the facility. Lastly, I examined the releases from regulated 
chemicals by taking the logarithm of the amount of releases emitted by the facility that are 
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regulated by the CAA and by taking the ratio of releases regulated by the CAA and amount of 
annual sales. 
I utilize facility-specific characteristic data from the National Establishment Time-Series 
(NETS) database (Bi 2011). I used the facility TRI identifier to merge the TRI with the NETS 
database. These facility characteristics include: annual sales (in dollars), number of employees, 
facility ownership type, facility and headquarter location as well as SIC codes and Dun and 
Bradstreet (D&B) parent company identification numbers. I only use the facilities that had 
employment and sales data for all 17 years to create a balanced panel of 18,862 facilities across 
all 50 states. Of these facilities that have continued operations, I focus on 11,975 facilities that 
reported their toxic emissions to the TRI at least one year from 1995 to 2011. Of these, I 
excluded the facilities with total toxic releases in the top percentile, because these releases could 
have been caused by bygone catastrophic events instead of production processes. As a result, my 
sample included 10,824 facilities and 184,008 observations. I constructed variables for 
employment and sales by taking the logarithm of the values for each facility. I constructed the 
dummy variable Headquarter Location where the value equals 1 if the facility is located in the 
same city as its headquarters, or 0 otherwise. Lastly, I used the facilities’ 4-digit SIC codes to 
construct industry-level fixed effects. 
In order to get data on the inspections and penalties incurred by each of the facilities, I 
used the facility TRI identifier to merge the data with the EPA’s AIRS Facility Subsystem 
database (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2012a). I constructed an indicator variable 
where the value equals 1 if the facility was penalized by the EPA’s Air Facility System (AFS), 
and 0 otherwise. 
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Next, I used the county and state location of the facility to merge the data set with 
household income data (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2012), county-level unemployment data 
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011), county attainment status data (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 2011b), and state-level data on environmental legislation (League of 
Conservation Voter 2011). I interpolated the household and economic data to create a balanced 
panel with all of the variables. I constructed an indicator variable for County Nonattainment 
Status where the value equals 1 if the county is out of attainment for at least one chemical, and 0 
otherwise. Lastly, I constructed State LCV Scores, by combining U.S. Senate and House of 
Representative voting record for environmental bills from LCV. 
 The summary statistics are shown in Table 2, and Figures 1-3 show the trends in 
employment, sales, and toxic releases over time. The average number of employees for facilities 
that have continued operations for the entire sample period decreased by 15% between 1995 and 
2011 (Figure 1), while the average amount of sales, measured in thousand dollars, increased by 
15% (Figure 2). The average toxic releases for facilities in my sample decreased by 54.1% 
(Figure 3). The average emissions from regulated chemicals for the facilities in my sample 
dropped by 57.1%, while the un-regulated toxic releases only decreased by 36.5%. Lastly, the 
average emissions per thousand dollars of sales decreased by 45.7% and the average regulated 
emissions per thousand dollars of sales decreased by 52.4% between 1995 and 2011. However, 
the average level of waste management for facilities also decreased by 13.8%. This suggests that 
over time facilities are reducing pollution by using more pollution prevention methods and using 
less waste management techniques that control pollution at the end of the process.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
 
Table 3 presents the coefficients of the 3SLS model with Toxic Emissions as the 
dependent variable for equation [1]. The determinants of Toxic Emissions are the same for all of 
the models; the differences between the specifications are in the determinants of Employment. 
Column (2) includes only Toxic Emissions, lagged Sales, and exogenous variables such as 
County Nonattainment Status, Income per Capita, and Unemployment Rate. Column (4) includes 
lagged Penalties in the Employment equation as well as in the Toxic Emissions equation. Lastly, 
column (6) includes Headquarter Location and Firm Ownership in the Employment equation. 
The signs and significance of the coefficients remain consistent throughout the specifications in 
Table 3.  
In the Employment equation (columns 2, 4, and 6), Toxic Emissions is positive and 
significant. This suggests that facilities with higher toxic releases have higher employment, and 
that with all other factors held constant facilities that lower their toxic releases have lower 
employment levels. Column 6 shows that a 1 percent reduction in toxic releases leads to a 7.3 
percent reduction in employment. We are holding all facility characteristics such as sales 
constant, which means that this coefficient is only picking up the direct effect of reductions in 
pollution on labor. In other words, this negative effect on employment indicates that labor and 
pollution are complements; and therefore, in order to reduce pollution, the facility must reduce 
labor and increase other inputs such as capital. Due to data limitations, I am unable to analyze 
the indirect effects of environmental performance on employment through changes in output. 
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In the Employment equation, Sales is positive and significant, which means facilities with 
larger sales have more employees. Firm Ownership is positive and significant, which means that 
on average publically owned facilities have more employees than privately owned facilities. 
County Nonattainment Status is significant and positive in all of the Employment equations, 
which suggests that facilities in dirtier areas with more air pollution have more employees. 
Penalties is negative and significant, which means that facilities that were penalized for being 
out of compliance with air regulations in the previous year tend to reduce their employment. 
Unemployment Rate is either insignificant or significant and positive. This suggests that the 
facilities have non-localized demands; and thus, the facilities tend to hire more workers due to 
the decrease in wages, or they are not affected by the unemployment rate. Next, Income per 
Capita is negative and significant, which means facilities located in an area with high per capita 
income have lower employment. This is consistent with Kassinis and Vafeas (2009) who 
explained that facilities located in higher income areas are more likely to shut down. Facilities 
located in higher income areas are likely to face more pressures to be socially responsible, and 
this could result in increased costs to the facility. Lastly, Headquarter Location is negative and 
significant. This is suggests that facilities located in the same city as their headquarter have lower 
employment. This unexpected sign could be due to the limited variation across time, since it is 
rare for facilities in my sample to move to new locations. 
Most of the signs of explanatory variables, in the Toxic Emissions equation (columns 1, 
3, and 5) are intuitive and consistent with previous literature. Sales and Siblings’ Pollution are 
positive and statistically significant. County Nonattainment Status and State LCV Score are 
negative and significant, which means that regulations indirectly pressure facilities to reduce 
their pollution. However, Penalties is positive and significant, which means facilities that were 
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penalized have larger amounts of toxic releases in the following year. The unexpected sign on 
Penalties could be attributed to two factors. First, regulators might target facilities that are larger 
and pollute more. Although I use the lagged value of the variable and I control for size using 
Sales, Penalties might still be highly correlated with facility size. Second, the penalties were 
imposed to the facility for non-compliance with regulated emissions; therefore, in an effort to be 
in compliance, facilities might have increased their toxic emissions—which are not regulated 
directly. Firm Ownership is positive and significant, which means facilities that are publically 
owned have more toxic releases than privately owned facilities. Headquarter Location is 
statistically significantly negative, which means facilities located near their headquarters have 
lower toxic releases. These coefficients of Firm Ownership and Headquarter Location are 
consistent with Doshi et al. (2013). Unemployment Rate is negative and significant, which is 
consistent with Arora and Cason (1998). Lastly, Final Goods and Income per Capita are both 
significant and negative, which suggests that community pressures lead facilities to reduce their 
toxic emissions. These results are similar to the results of Bi and Khanna (2012). 
 In the model examining total toxic releases, we find that, for a given level of sales, 
improving environmental performance by reducing toxic emissions does have an adverse effect 
on employment. However, this could be driven by the methods and technologies that facilities 
use in order to reduce pollution. Next, we examine how different abatement methods could affect 
facilities employment. 
First, we will examine how pollution prevention through increased efficiency affects 
employment by analyzing Emissions per Unit of Sales (results in Table 4). In Table 4, Emissions 
per Unit of Sales is positive and significant. This means that a reduction in Emissions per Unit of 
Sales results in lower employment. In other words, facilities that are more pollution-intensive 
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tend to have more employment. The signs and significance of the other exogenous variables 
either remained unchanged or became insignificant. 
In order to fully understand what the positive coefficient of Emissions per Unit of Sales 
means in terms of its affect on employment, we need to examine the numerical changes in the 
amount of toxic emissions in pounds, emissions per thousand dollars of sales, and employment, 
given a one percent reduction in toxic emissions. The results from these calculated levels are 
presented in Table 8. First, I calculated a one percent change in the average Toxic Emissions for 
the sample as 265.25 pounds. Next, I calculated the level change in Emissions per Unit of Sales 
from a one percent change in toxic emissions, when we hold sales constant, which equals 
0.00694 pounds per thousand dollars of sales. This equals an 11.4% change in Emissions per 
Unit of Sales. Lastly, I evaluate how these changes in Toxic Emissions and Emissions per Unit of 
Sales affect the average number of employees. I calculate the changes in Employment from a one 
percent change in Toxic Emissions, by multiplying the average Employment of the sample by the 
coefficient of Toxic Emissions in column 6 of Table 3 
I find that a one percent decrease in Toxic Emissions results in employment decreasing by 
18 employees; however, when the one percent decrease in toxic release is conducted through 
reducing Emissions per Unit of Sales by using pollution prevention methods, then facility-level 
employment only decreases by 7 employees. This is consistent with expectations, since we 
would anticipate that pollution prevention methods would be less costly to facilities than end of 
process pollution control methods, and thus facilities might not reduce as many employees. 
Next, I analyze how an increase in Waste Management–through recycling, treatment, or 
energy recovery—affects facilities’ employment. I conduct this analysis by estimating two 3SLS 
models; the coefficients for the models are shown in Table 5. I only present the models that 
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include all the relevant variables. For the first model, I estimate equation [1] and [2] using Waste 
Management as the dependent variable in equation [1] and the endogenous variable in equation 
[2], and I use Siblings’ Waste Management as the instrumental variable. The results from this 
model are shown in columns (1) and (2). The coefficient of Waste Management is statistically 
significantly negative in the employment model, which suggests that an increase in pollution 
control through waste management by one percent significantly decreases employment by 10.8 
percent. The calculated results in Table 8 show that this one-percent decrease in waste 
management results in a reduction in the number of employees by about 26 people. The sign and 
significance of the explanatory variables Sales, Siblings’ Waste Management, Firm Ownership, 
Income per Capita, Unemployment Rate, and Headquarter Location are similar to the results in 
Table 3. However, County Nonattainment Status, State LCV Scores, and Final Good become 
insignificant, and Penalties has a positive sign—which, as mentioned above, could be due to 
regulators targeting large, highly-polluting facilities.  
For the second model, I estimate three equations by using both Toxic Emissions and 
Waste Management as separate dependent variables in equation [1] and as endogenous variables 
in equation [2]; these results are shown in columns (3), (4), and (5). In the Employment equation, 
Toxic Emissions is significantly positive and Waste Management is significantly negative. This 
means that both a decrease in toxic releases or an increase in waste management results in a 
decrease in employment, holding all else constant. As I mentioned earlier, Waste Management 
includes chemical, material, or energy wastes that were treated, recovered, or recycled after the 
wastes were generated. Therefore, these management techniques are likely be costly to the 
facilities, since they are implemented at the end of the production process and they do not 
increase efficiency. 
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Lastly, I use CAA Regulated Emissions and CAA Regulated Emissions per Unit of Sales 
as the dependent variables in equation [1] in order to analyze employment effects from 
reductions in regulated chemicals. The coefficients of these models are presented in Tables 6 and 
7. In Table 6, CAA Regulated Emissions is positive and significant in the Employment equation, 
which means that reductions in regulated releases result in reductions in facilities employment. 
The coefficients of regulated emissions and the other explanatory variables are similar to the 
model that includes toxic releases of both regulated and non-regulated chemicals (in Table 3); 
therefore, there is no significant difference between the effects of a reduction in regulated 
chemicals the effects of a reduction in non-regulated chemicals on employment. 
Finally, in Table 7, CAA Regulated Emissions per Unit of Sales is positive and 
significant. Similar to total Emissions per Unit of Sales, these results suggests that a decrease in 
the pollution intensity of the facility reduces employment. The signs and significance of the 
explanatory variables did not change from total Emissions per Unit of Sales model. In Table 8, 
the calculated changes in levels of regulated emissions, regulated emissions per unit of sales and 
employment show that a one percent decrease in CAA Regulated Emissions results in a reduction 
in employment by about 17 people. However, a one percent decrease in regulated emissions 
through a decrease in Regulated Emissions per Unit of Sales equals a reduction in employment 
of only 8 employees. These results are similar to reductions in total emissions and emission per 
unit of sales; however, a decrease in Regulated Emissions per Unit of Sales from a one percent 
decrease in regulated emissions reduces employment slightly more than a decrease in Emissions 
per Unit of Sales from a one percent decrease in total emissions. This could be due to the 
inflexible command and control regulation requirements. For example, the CAA might require 
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facilities to install end-of-pipe techniques to reduce releases, instead of allowing them to change 
their production process or increase efficiency. 
Next, I use three other variables to check the robustness of using Siblings’ Pollution as an 
instrumental variable in the Employment equation. I use each of the three variables separately in 
each model as an alternative instrumental variable, replacing Siblings’ Pollution. The results 
from these models are shown in Tables 9-13; I only include the models with all the relevant 
variables. I use the Pollution per Sibling (shown in columns 1 and 2), Same-Industry Sibling’s 
Pollution (columns 3 and 4), and Same-Industry Pollution per Sibling (columns 5 and 6). All of 
the models, except the Waste Management models (in Table 11), are robust to the different 
variables; the coefficients remain consistent throughout the models and are similar to the original 
models with Siblings’ Pollution. In Table 11, I use Waste Management per Sibling (columns 1 
and 2), Same-Industry Sibling’s Waste Management (columns 3 and 4), and Same-Industry 
Waste Management per Sibling (columns 5 and 6) as alternative instrumental variables. In these 
specifications, the coefficient of Waste Management is positive and significant. However, this 
could be due to the limited number of facilities that report waste management in the sample. 
Toxic Emissions, Emissions per Unit of Sales, CAA Regulated Emissions, and Regulated 
Emissions per Unit of Sales are positive and significant in all of the models (Tables 9, 10, 12, 
and 13, respectively). 
Overall, these results show that reductions in toxic releases tend to result in a decrease in 
employment. However, this could be due to facilities using costly end-of-pipe pollution control 
techniques in order to reduce emissions. Furthermore, facilities might be choosing these costly 
methods of pollution reduction because they are required to use them by command and control 
regulations. When the facilities chose cheaper, more flexible methods of pollution control such 
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as pollution prevention at the source, then the affects of environmental performance on 
employment are not as adverse as when the facilities reduces pollution end of the process 
techniques. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the effects of voluntary environmental performance on facility-level 
employment due to public disclosure of toxic releases. I utilize a unique facility-level data set of 
over 10,000 facilities across the United States, which enables me to conduct a detailed analysis 
on facilities’ methods of environmental performance and how those methods affect facility-level 
employment. I use a 3SLS model to allow pollution and labor to be determined simultaneously 
by the facility. Also, I examine how external pressures might lead a facility to change its 
pollution and employment. 
The results show that overall reductions in toxic releases have a negative impact on 
employment. However, I also find that the method of pollution reductions plays an important 
role in determining how facilities’ employment changes. If the facility prevents pollution at the 
source by increasing efficiency or substituting non-toxic chemicals, then the facility decrease its 
employment less than if the facility controls pollution at the end of the process or by treating 
waste, recycling chemicals or materials, or recovering energy. This makes intuitive sense, since 
end of the pipe methods are often more costly than pollution prevention and do not change the 
production process to be more efficient. Lastly, reducing regulated chemicals has a negative 
effect on employment. This is likely due to the command and control regulations requiring costly 
pollution control methods. 
There are several approaches that could by studied to further research on how 
environmental performance affects employment. First, future studies could examine both the 
direct affect and indirect affect of pollution reduction on employment. As I mentioned before, I 
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only analyze the direct effect of improvements in environmental performance on employment 
through substitution of inputs. Due to lack of data on the input or output price of the facilities’ 
goods, I am unable to examine how environmental performance indirectly affects employment 
through changes in the supply or demand. However, this indirect affect could be significant. For 
example, if the facility is able to differentiate its product and charge a higher price for producing 
an environmentally friendly good, then the facility might be able to increase profits and increase 
employment. Second, in my analysis, due to the nature of the TRI data set, I examine total 
pollution reductions in pounds. However, in order to get an understanding of how changes in 
employment through reductions in pollution affect society, future studies could weight the total 
pollution reductions by the toxicity of pollutants. Future research could examine whether 
reductions in highly toxic pollutants have different affects on employment than weakly toxic 
pollutants; and the study could balance the adverse effects on employment with the beneficial 
effects on human health. Lastly, future studies could use a change in the reporting threshold as an 
exogenous shock to control for the endogeneity of pollution reductions. Due to data limitations, I 
am unable to examine the magnitude of the TRI threshold change for each specific chemical and 
exactly when the change occurred. 
In conclusion, although regulators have been focused on implementing command and 
control regulations, these are costly to facilities and may have adverse effects on facilities’ 
employment. My results show that if policy makers implemented more flexible regulations, 
instead of command and control regulations, then facilities would respond by reducing pollution, 
increasing efficiency, and would reduce employment less than under rigid regulations. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: Variable Description 
Variable Name Description 
Employment (Logged) Establishment Employment in a year t (logged) 
Toxic Emissions (Logged) Releases from core chemicals that remained from 1987 to present, in 
pounds (added 1 and logged) 
Waste Management (Logged) Amount of waste management from treating waste, recycling chemicals 
or materials, or energy recovery, in pounds (added 1 and logged) 
Emissions per Unit of Sales (Logged) Releases from core chemicals per 1,000 dollars of sales (added 1 and 
logged) 
CAA Regulated Emissions (Logged) Releases from core chemicals regulated by the CAA, in pounds (added 1 
and logged) 
CAA Regulated Emissions per unit of 
Sales (Logged) 
Releases from core chemicals regulated by the CAA per 1,000 dollars of 
sales (added 1 and logged) 
TRI Report Reporting indicator (1= facility reported 0 emissions or positive TRI, 0= 
facility did not report emissions) 
Sales (per thousand dollars, logged) Establishment sales per 1,000 dollars in year t-1 (logged) 
Siblings' Pollution Releases from the facility's sibling facilities of core chemicals that 
remained from 1987 to present, in pounds 
Siblings' Waste Management Amount chemicals that were treated, recycled, or the amount of energy 
recovery from the facility's sibling facilities, in pounds 
Pollution per Sibling Amount core chemical releases from the facility’s sibling facilities 
divided by the number of sibling facilities, in pounds per sibling 
Same-Industry Siblings’ Pollution Amount of core chemical releases from the facility’s sibling facilities that 
had the same 4-digit SIC code, in pounds 
Same-Industry Pollution per Sibling Amount of core chemical releases from the facility’s sibling facilities that 
had the same 4-digit SIC code divided by the number of same-
industry sibling facilities, in pounds per sibling 
Waste Management per Sibling Amount chemicals that were treated, recycled, or the amount of energy 
recovery from the facility's sibling facilities divided by the number 
of sibling facilities, in pounds per sibling 
Same-Industry Siblings’ Waste 
Management 
Amount of chemicals that were treated, recycled, or the amount of energy 
recovery from the facility’s sibling facilities that had the same 4-
digit SIC code, in pounds 
Same-Industry Waste Management per 
Sibling 
Amount of chemicals that were treated, recycled, or the amount of energy 
recovery from the facility’s sibling facilities that had the same 4-
digit SIC code divided by the number of same-industry sibling 
facilities, in pounds per sibling 
County Nonattainment Status Nonattainment status indicator for the county in year t-1 (1= out of 
attainment for at least one criteria pollutant, 0= in attainment) 
Penalties Penalty indicator in AFS in year t-1 (1= penalized, 0= not penalized) 
State LCV Scores State voting record for environmental bills (from the Senate and House of 
Representatives) 
Firm Ownership Public/Private Indicator for the last year (1=Public, 0=Private or 
Government) 
Final Goods Final good indicator (1= produces final goods, 0= produces intermediate 
goods) 
Income per Capita (Logged) Personal per capita income for each county (logged) 
Unemployment Rate County unemployment rate in year t-1 (in percent) 
Headquarter Location Headquarter location indicator (1= facility located in the same city in the 
same city as headquarter, 0= facility located in different city) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (1995‐2011) 
 
All Facilities 
Facilities that report to 
TRI for the entire period 
Facilities that report 
intermittently 
    
Employment (Logged) 4.5795 4.9559 4.4424 
 
(1.3656) (1.3714) (1.3374) 
Toxic Emissions (Logged) 4.8806 9.0384 3.3669 
 
(4.5725) (2.6490) (4.1689) 
Waste Management 
(Logged) 4.8551 9.0944 3.3117 
 
(5.5462) (5.1881) (4.8203) 
Emissions per unit of Sales 
(Logged) 0.4518 0.9118 0.2843 
 
(0.8758) (1.1288) (0.6909) 
CAA Regulated Emissions 
(Logged) 4.3129 8.1540 2.9144 
 
(4.5925) (3.6340) (4.0786) 
CAA Regulated Emissions 
per unit of Sales (Logged) 0.3996 0.8030 0.2527 
 
(0.8298) (1.0827) (0.6570) 
Sales (per thousand 
dollars, logged) 9.4114 9.8520 9.2510 
 
(1.5213) (1.5235) (1.4884) 
Siblings' Pollution (in 
pounds) 225020.80 355560.8 177493.4 
 
(7.77E+05) (9.47E+05) (6.99E+05) 
Siblings' Waste 
Management (in pounds) 3774149.00 5892519 3002886 
 
(1.95E+07) (2.42E+07) (1.74E+07) 
County Nonattainment 
Status 0.4619 0.4443 0.4683 
 
(0.4985) (0.4969) (0.4990) 
Penalties 0.0187 0.0374 0.0118 
 
(0.1353) (0.1897) (0.1082) 
State LCV Scores 95.4267 93.0625 96.2875 
 
(51.0125) (50.0076) (51.3466) 
Firm Ownership 0.2583 0.3337 0.2309 
 
(0.4377) (0.4715) (0.4214) 
Final Goods 0.1350 0.1522 0.1287 
 
(0.3417) (0.3592) (0.3349) 
Income per Capita 
(Logged) 10.3221 10.3052 10.3283 
 
(0.2779) (0.2670) (0.2816) 
Unemployment Rate 
(percent) 5.8051 5.8215 5.7992 
 
(2.4788) (2.4100) (2.5033) 
Headquarter Location 0.4374 0.3541 0.4678 
 
(0.4961) (0.4782) (0.4990) 
   
Number of Facilities 10824 2889 7935 
Total Observations 184008 49113 134895 
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Figure 1. Average Employment, 1995‐2011 
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Figure 2. Average Sales, 1995‐2011 
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Figure 3. Average Toxic Releases, 1995‐2011 
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Table 3: Estimates of Facility‐Level Toxic Emissions and Employment (1995‐2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Toxic 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Toxic 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Toxic 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
              
Toxic Emissions 
(Logged) 
 
0.0883*** 
 
0.115*** 
 
0.0733*** 
Formant so  
 
(0.00494) 
 
(0.00643) 
 
(0.00688) 
TRI Report 
 
-0.199*** 
 
-0.301*** 
 
-0.200*** 
  
(0.0339) 
 
(0.0439) 
 
(0.0469) 
Salest-1 (per thousand 
dollars, logged) 0.625*** 0.714*** 0.626*** 0.702*** 0.631*** 0.721*** 
 
(0.00786) (0.00204) (0.00786) (0.00244) (0.00787) (0.00239) 
Siblings' Pollution 3.98e-07*** 
 
3.77e-07*** 
 
4.09e-07*** 
 
 
(1.44e-08) 
 
(1.45e-08) 
 
(1.48e-08) 
 County 
Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.166*** 0.0174*** -0.170*** 0.0231*** -0.169*** 0.0168*** 
 
(0.0247) (0.00403) (0.0247) (0.00429) (0.0247) (0.00390) 
Penaltiest-1 2.447*** 
 
2.607*** -0.138*** 2.612*** -0.0481*** 
 
(0.0714) 
 
(0.0737) (0.0155) (0.0737) (0.0149) 
State LCV Scores -0.00225*** 
 
-0.00210*** 
 
-0.00233*** 
 
 
(0.000215) 
 
(0.000212) 
 
(0.000220) 
 Firm Ownership 0.274*** 
 
0.275*** 
 
0.209*** 0.0377*** 
 
(0.0260) 
 
(0.0254) 
 
(0.0273) (0.00423) 
Final Goods -5.449** 
 
-5.440** 
 
-5.400** 
 
 
(2.451) 
 
(2.451) 
 
(2.451) 
 Income per Capita 
(Logged) -1.141*** -0.0901*** -1.155*** -0.0619*** -1.156*** -0.0991*** 
 
(0.0636) (0.0105) (0.0636) (0.0114) (0.0637) (0.0104) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.0765*** 0.00124 -0.0774*** 0.00270** -0.0764*** 9.80e-05 
 
(0.00684) (0.00109) (0.00684) (0.00115) (0.00685) (0.00104) 
Headquarter Location -0.338*** 
 
-0.333*** 
 
-0.273*** -0.0386*** 
 
(0.0233) 
 
(0.0229) 
 
(0.0244) (0.00409) 
Constant 11.54*** -2.191*** 11.66*** -2.454*** 11.58*** -2.047*** 
 
(1.530) (0.248) (1.529) (0.261) (1.530) (0.236) 
       Observations 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 
AIC 1290640 1290596 1289911 
BIC 1303892 1303858 1303193 
R-squared 0.201 0.811 0.201 0.811 0.201 0.812 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported.  
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Table 4: Estimates of Facility‐Level Emissions per Unit of Sales and Employment (1995‐2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Emissions per 
unit of Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Emissions per 
unit of Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Emissions per 
unit of Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment  
(Logged) 
              
Emissions per unit 
of Sales (Logged) 
 
0.434*** 
 
0.499*** 
 
0.267*** 
  
(0.0187) 
 
(0.0219) 
 
(0.0238) 
TRI Report 
 
0.0396*** 
 
0.0181 
 
0.0682*** 
  
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
(0.0163) 
Salest-1 (per 
thousand, logged) 
 
0.763*** 
 
0.768*** 
 
0.754*** 
  
(0.00286) 
 
(0.00332) 
 
(0.00365) 
Siblings' Pollution 8.06e-08*** 
 
7.73e-08*** 
 
8.77e-08*** 
 
 
(2.69e-09) 
 
(2.71e-09) 
 
(2.83e-09) 
 County 
Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.0503*** 0.0280*** -0.0510*** 0.0327*** -0.0506*** 0.0203*** 
 
(0.00477) (0.00427) (0.00477) (0.00443) (0.00478) (0.00410) 
Penaltiest-1 0.349*** 
 
0.383*** -0.0873*** 0.386*** -0.00611 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0138) 
State LCV Scores -0.000709*** 
 
-0.000676*** 
 
-0.000789*** 
 
 
(3.94e-05) 
 
(3.91e-05) 
 
(4.16e-05) 
 Firm Ownership -0.00171 
 
-3.31e-05 
 
-0.0322*** 0.0560*** 
 
(0.00466) 
 
(0.00458) 
 
(0.00522) (0.00425) 
Final Goods -0.208 
 
-0.289 
 
-0.284 
 
 
(0.440) 
 
(0.474) 
 
(0.474) 
 Income per Capita 
(Logged) -0.0943*** -0.119*** -0.0971*** -0.110*** -0.0947*** -0.129*** 
 
(0.0123) (0.0104) (0.0123) (0.0107) (0.0123) (0.00979) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.00418*** -0.000728 -0.00437*** -0.000380 -0.00385*** -0.00157 
 
(0.00132) (0.00113) (0.00132) (0.00115) (0.00132) (0.00105) 
Headquarter 
Location -0.0644*** 
 
-0.0631*** 
 
-0.0466*** -0.0432*** 
 
(0.00423) 
 
(0.00418) 
 
(0.00469) (0.00424) 
Constant 1.308*** -2.131*** 1.334*** -2.283*** 1.305*** -1.860*** 
 
(0.295) (0.259) (0.295) (0.266) (0.295) (0.244) 
       Observations 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 
AIC -310531.2 -310624 -311458.9 
BIC -297289.5 -297372.2 -298187 
R-squared 0.170 0.812 0.170 0.812 0.170 0.813 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported.  
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Table 5: Estimates of Facility‐Level Waste Management and Employment (1995‐2011) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Waste 
Management 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged)  
Toxic Releases 
(Logged) 
Waste 
Management 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
              
Toxic Emissions 
(Logged)    
  
0.102*** 
      
(0.0151) 
Waste Management 
(Logged) 
 
-0.108*** 
   
-0.0617*** 
  
(0.0181) 
   
(0.0165) 
TRI Report 
 
0.208* 
   
-0.0532 
  
(0.120) 
   
(0.0538) 
Salest-1 (per thousand 
dollars, logged) 0.899*** 0.845*** 
 
0.634*** 0.899*** 0.751*** 
 
(0.00950) (0.0105) 
 
(0.00787) (0.00950) (0.00604) 
Siblings' Pollution 
  
2.65e-07*** 2.65e-07*** 
 
    
(1.25e-08) 
  Siblings' Waste 
Management 6.71e-09*** 
   
7.12e-09*** 
 
 
(6.40e-10) 
   
(5.11e-10) 
 County Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.0173 0.00382 
 
-0.169*** -0.00937 0.0227*** 
 
(0.0298) (0.00480) 
 
(0.0247) (0.0299) (0.00493) 
Penaltiest-1 2.405*** 0.331*** 
 
2.609*** 2.407*** 0.00152 
 
(0.0890) (0.0269) 
 
(0.0737) (0.0890) (0.0162) 
State LCV Scores 0.000345 
  
-0.00223*** -0.000215 
 
 
(0.000229) 
  
(0.000224) (0.000271) 
 Firm Ownership 0.637*** 0.125*** 
 
0.249*** 0.633*** 0.0669*** 
 
(0.0329) (0.0105) 
 
(0.0272) (0.0328) (0.00795) 
Final Goods 1.079 
  
-5.591** 1.057 
 
 
(2.960) 
  
(2.275) (2.960) 
 Income per Capita 
(Logged) -0.762*** -0.235*** 
 
-1.160*** -0.720*** -0.0927*** 
 
(0.0763) (0.0120) 
 
(0.0638) (0.0771) (0.0134) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.0798*** -0.0108*** 
 
-0.0772*** -0.0766*** -0.000679 
 
(0.00824) (0.00132) 
 
(0.00685) (0.00828) (0.00113) 
Headquarter Location -0.543*** -0.119*** 
 
-0.301*** -0.540*** -0.0606*** 
 
(0.0292) (0.00949) 
 
(0.0243) (0.0292) (0.00605) 
Constant -1.518 -1.716*** 
 
11.60*** -1.919 -2.685*** 
 
(1.845) (0.336) 
 
(1.530) (1.848) (0.339) 
       Observations 173,184 173,184 
 
173,184 173,184 173,184 
AIC 515492.1 
 
1357661 
BIC 528764 
 
1370943 
R-squared 0.212 0.664   0.200 0.212 0.750 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported. 
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Table 6: Estimates of Facility‐Level Regulated Emissions and Employment (1995‐2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
CAA 
Regulated 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
CAA 
Regulated 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
CAA 
Regulated 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
              
CAA Regulated 
Emissions (Logged) 
 
0.0814*** 
 
0.108*** 
 
0.0693*** 
  
(0.00478) 
 
(0.00637) 
 
(0.00661) 
TRI Report 
 
-0.0766*** 
 
-0.148*** 
 
-0.105*** 
  
(0.0289) 
 
(0.0382) 
 
(0.0396) 
Salest-1 (per thousand 
dollars, logged) 0.569*** 0.717*** 0.569*** 0.705*** 0.575*** 0.723*** 
 
(0.00780) (0.00196) (0.00780) (0.00235) (0.00781) (0.00225) 
Siblings' Pollution 3.98e-07*** 
 
3.73e-07*** 
 
4.09e-07*** 
 
 
(1.42e-08) 
 
(1.42e-08) 
 
(1.47e-08) 
 County 
Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.195*** 0.0193*** -0.199*** 0.0261*** -0.199*** 0.0188*** 
 
(0.0245) (0.00409) (0.0245) (0.00441) (0.0246) (0.00398) 
Penaltiest-1 2.379*** 
 
2.559*** -0.142*** 2.565*** -0.0509*** 
 
(0.0703) 
 
(0.0732) (0.0160) (0.0732) (0.0151) 
State LCV Scores -0.00237*** 
 
-0.00219*** 
 
-0.00246*** 
 
 
(0.000210) 
 
(0.000206) 
 
(0.000217) 
 Firm Ownership 0.251*** 
 
0.253*** 
 
0.175*** 0.0386*** 
 
(0.0253) 
 
(0.0246) 
 
(0.0271) (0.00423) 
Final Goods -5.647** 
 
-5.636** 
 
-5.738** 
 
 
(2.433) 
 
(2.433) 
 
(2.258) 
 Income per Capita 
(Logged) -1.163*** -0.0851*** -1.178*** -0.0529*** -1.181*** -0.0927*** 
 
(0.0631) (0.0108) (0.0630) (0.0119) (0.0632) (0.0108) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.0782*** 0.00203* -0.0792*** 0.00386*** -0.0781*** 0.000860 
 
(0.00679) (0.00111) (0.00679) (0.00118) (0.00680) (0.00106) 
Headquarter Location -0.333*** 
 
-0.328*** 
 
-0.255*** -0.0398*** 
 
(0.0227) 
 
(0.0221) 
 
(0.0242) (0.00407) 
Constant 12.54*** -2.319*** 12.68*** -2.644*** 12.60*** -2.172*** 
 
(1.518) (0.251) (1.518) (0.268) (1.519) (0.240) 
       Observations 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 
AIC -118136.3 -118199 -118758.4 
BIC -106793.3 -106846.6 -107387.2 
R-squared 0.217 0.811 0.217 0.811 0.217 0.812 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported 
 
 
  
  44 
Table 7: Estimates of Facility‐Level Regulated Emissions per Unit of Sales and Employment (1995‐
2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Regulated 
Emissions per 
unit of Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Regulated 
Emissions per 
unit of Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Regulated 
Emissions per 
unit of Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
              
Regulated 
Emissions per unit 
of Sales (Logged) 
 
0.485*** 
 
0.562*** 
 
0.304*** 
  
(0.0219) 
 
(0.0260) 
 
(0.0267) 
TRI Report 
 
0.0408*** 
 
0.0184 
 
0.0674*** 
  
(0.0138) 
 
(0.0161) 
 
(0.0165) 
Salest-1 (per 
thousand dollars, 
logged) 
 
0.764*** 
 
0.769*** 
 
0.754*** 
  
(0.00312) 
 
(0.00366) 
 
(0.00382) 
Siblings' Pollution 7.33e-08*** 
 
6.98e-08*** 
 
8.05e-08*** 
 
 
(2.55e-09) 
 
(2.58e-09) 
 
(2.69e-09) 
 County 
Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.0545*** 0.0321*** -0.0552*** 0.0377*** -0.0551*** 0.0233*** 
 
(0.00452) (0.00440) (0.00452) (0.00461) (0.00452) (0.00423) 
Penaltiest-1 0.306*** 
 
0.337*** -0.0861*** 0.341*** -0.00634 
 
(0.0123) 
 
(0.0135) (0.0149) (0.0135) (0.0139) 
State LCV Scores -0.000576*** 
 
-0.000546*** 
 
-0.000645*** 
 
 
(3.68e-05) 
 
(3.64e-05) 
 
(3.90e-05) 
 Firm Ownership -0.00181 
 
-5.71e-05 
 
-0.0324*** 0.0569*** 
 
(0.00436) 
 
(0.00427) 
 
(0.00494) (0.00428) 
Final Goods -0.203 
 
-0.200 
 
-0.258 
 
 
(0.416) 
 
(0.416) 
 
(0.449) 
 Income per Capita 
(Logged) -0.0955*** -0.117*** -0.0980*** -0.107*** -0.0977*** -0.126*** 
 
(0.0116) (0.0106) (0.0116) (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.00992) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.00510*** -0.000234 -0.00527*** 0.000212 -0.00486*** -0.00122 
 
(0.00125) (0.00115) (0.00125) (0.00117) (0.00125) (0.00106) 
Headquarter 
Location -0.0475*** 
 
-0.0469*** 
 
-0.0263*** -0.0475*** 
 
(0.00394) 
 
(0.00388) 
 
(0.00445) (0.00411) 
Constant 1.303*** -2.173*** 1.326*** -2.339*** 1.315*** -1.900*** 
 
(0.279) (0.264) (0.279) (0.272) (0.279) (0.247) 
       Observations 89,811 89,811 89,811 89,811 89,811 89,811 
AIC -121590.2 -121646.9 -122143.4 
BIC -110237.8 -110285.1 -110762.8 
R-squared 0.206 0.811 0.206 0.811 0.206 0.812 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported. 
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Table 8: Percent and Absolute Changes in Pollution and Employment 
Avg. Employment: 239  
Avg. Sales (per thousand dollars): 38,229  
Avg. Toxic Emissions: 26,525  
Avg. Emissions per unit of sales: 6.082  
Avg. Regulated Emissions: 21,964.71  
Avg. Regulated Emissions per unit of sales: 5.164  
   
Changes due to a 1% decrease in Toxic Emissionsα 
 Percent Level 
Toxic Releases: -1% -265.25 lbs. 
Emissions per unit of sales: -11.4% -0.00694 lbs./$1000 sales 
Number of Employees: -7.3% -18 employees 
 
Changes due to a 11.4% decrease in Emissions per Unit of Salesα 
 Percent Level 
Number of Employees: -3.05% -7 employees 
   
   
Changes due to a 1% decrease in Waste Management 
 Percent Level 
Number of Employees: 10.8% 26 employees 
   
   
Changes due to a 1% decrease in CAA Regulated Emissionsβ 
 Percent Level 
Regulated Releases: -1% -219.65 lbs. 
Regulated Emissions per unit of sales: -11.1% -0.00575 lbs./$1000 sales 
Number of Employees: -6.9% -17 employees 
   
Changes due to a 11.1% decrease in Regulated Emissions per Unit of Salesβ 
 Percent Level 
Number of Employees: -3.382% -8 employees 
   
   
α The percent reductions calculated result from a 265.25 lbs reduction in toxic releases 
β The percent reductions calculated result from a 219.65 lbs reduction in CAA regulated toxic releases  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Table 9: Estimates of Facility‐Level Toxic Emissions and Employment, Robustness Checks (1995‐
2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Toxic 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Toxic 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Toxic 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
              
Toxic Emissions 
(Logged) 
 
0.104*** 
 
0.0842*** 
 
0.105*** 
  
(0.00634) 
 
(0.00736) 
 
(0.00699) 
TRI Report 
 
-0.306*** 
 
-0.227*** 
 
-0.305*** 
  
(0.0433) 
 
(0.0501) 
 
(0.0477) 
Salest-1 (per thousand 
dollars, logged) 0.625*** 0.707*** 0.632*** 0.715*** 0.628*** 0.706*** 
 
(0.00788) (0.00229) (0.00787) (0.00253) (0.00788) (0.00246) 
Pollution per Sibling 5.07e-06***      
 (1.67e-07)      
Same-Industry 
Siblings’ Pollution   1.03e-06***    
   (3.78e-08)    
Same-Industry 
Pollution per Sibling 
     
4.07e-06*** 
      
(1.45e-07) 
County Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.166*** 0.0221*** -0.173*** 0.0187*** -0.170*** 0.0223*** 
 
(0.0247) (0.00407) (0.0247) (0.00400) (0.0247) (0.00412) 
Penaltiest-1 2.586*** -0.109*** 2.586*** -0.0716*** 2.575*** -0.112*** 
 
(0.0737) (0.0149) (0.0737) (0.0156) (0.0737) (0.0155) 
State LCV Scores -0.00212*** 
 
-0.00216*** 
 
-0.0021*** 
 
 
(0.000215) 
 
(0.000218) 
 
(0.000215) 
 Firm Ownership 0.254*** 0.0306*** 0.249*** 0.0348*** 0.281*** 0.0302*** 
 
(0.0270) (0.00443) (0.0271) (0.00434) (0.0270) (0.00447) 
Final Goods -5.365** 
 
-5.585** 
 
-5.575** 
 
 
(2.450) 
 
(2.275) 
 
(2.275) 
 Income per Capita 
(Logged) -1.164*** -0.0690*** -1.151*** -0.0874*** -1.150*** -0.0674*** 
 
(0.0636) (0.0108) (0.0637) (0.0108) (0.0636) (0.0110) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.0786*** 0.00181* -0.0786*** 0.000812 -0.0793*** 0.00192* 
 
(0.00684) (0.00110) (0.00685) (0.00107) (0.00684) (0.00110) 
Headquarter Location -0.258*** -0.0292*** -0.321*** -0.0351*** -0.306*** -0.0288*** 
 
(0.0244) (0.00422) (0.0242) (0.00422) (0.0242) (0.00430) 
Constant 11.71*** -2.336*** 11.55*** -2.161*** 11.56*** -2.352*** 
 
(1.529) (0.248) (1.530) (0.242) (1.530) (0.250) 
       Observations 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 
AIC 1290640 1290596 1289911 
BIC 1303892 1303858 1303193 
R-squared 0.201 0.811 0.201 0.811 0.201 0.812 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported.  
  47 
Table 10: Estimates of Facility‐Level Emissions per Unit of Sales and Employment, Robustness Checks 
(1995‐2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Emissions 
per unit of 
Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Emissions 
per unit of 
Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Emissions 
per unit of 
Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment  
(Logged) 
              
Emissions per unit of 
Sales (Logged) 
 
0.386*** 
 
0.259*** 
 
0.376*** 
  
(0.0215) 
 
(0.0202) 
 
(0.0230) 
TRI Report 
 
0.0458*** 
 
0.0708*** 
 
0.0516*** 
  
(0.0149) 
 
(0.0140) 
 
(0.0158) 
Salest-1 (per thousand, 
logged) 
 
0.758*** 
 
0.753*** 
 
0.757*** 
  
(0.00335) 
 
(0.00316) 
 
(0.00354) 
Pollution per Sibling 1.14e-06*** 
     
 
(3.19e-08) 
     Same-Industry 
Siblings’ Pollution   2.79e-07***    
   (7.27e-09)    
Same-Industry 
Pollution per Sibling     9.35e-07***  
     (2.77e-08)  
County 
Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.0502*** 0.0276*** -0.0517*** 0.0198*** -0.0510*** 0.0269*** 
 
(0.00477) (0.00422) (0.00477) (0.00402) (0.00477) (0.00425) 
Penaltiest-1 0.379*** -0.0489*** 0.379*** -0.00308 0.377*** -0.0457*** 
 
(0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0132) (0.0142) (0.0141) 
State LCV Scores -0.00072*** 
 
-0.00076*** 
 
-0.00071*** 
 
 
(4.01e-05) 
 
(4.14e-05) 
 
(4.03e-05) 
 Firm Ownership -0.0237*** 0.0558*** -0.0276*** 0.0561*** -0.0176*** 0.0559*** 
 
(0.00517) (0.00443) (0.00518) (0.00422) (0.00516) (0.00443) 
Final Goods -0.272 
 
-0.286 
 
-0.209 
 
 
(0.473) 
 
(0.473) 
 
(0.439) 
 Income per Capita 
(Logged) -0.0984*** -0.113*** -0.0929*** -0.130*** -0.0948*** -0.114*** 
 
(0.0123) (0.0102) (0.0123) (0.00971) (0.0123) (0.0102) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.00447*** -0.000795 -0.00433*** -0.00162 -0.00459*** -0.000823 
 
(0.00132) (0.00110) (0.00132) (0.00105) (0.00132) (0.00110) 
Headquarter Location -0.0422*** -0.0349*** -0.0552*** -0.0438*** -0.0528*** -0.0357*** 
 
(0.00470) (0.00432) (0.00466) (0.00410) (0.00467) (0.00436) 
Constant 1.333*** -2.092*** 1.293*** -1.841*** 1.305*** -2.071*** 
 
(0.295) (0.254) (0.295) (0.242) (0.295) (0.254) 
       Observations 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 
AIC -310531.2 -310624 -311458.9 
BIC -297289.5 -297372.2 -298187 
R-squared 0.170 0.812 0.170 0.812 0.170 0.813 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported.  
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Table 11: Estimates of Waste Management and Employment, Robustness Checks (1995‐2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Waste 
Management 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Waste 
Management 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Waste 
Management 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
              
Waste Management 
(Log) 
 
0.0212* 
 
0.0998*** 
 
0.143*** 
  
(0.0125) 
 
(0.0160) 
 
(0.0167) 
TRI Report 
 
-0.0103 
 
0.0600 
 
-0.0612 
  
(0.0827) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.111) 
Salest-1 (per 
thousand dollars, 
logged) 0.900*** 0.739*** 0.896*** 0.665*** 0.894*** 0.632*** 
 
(0.00950) (0.00721) (0.00950) (0.00931) (0.00951) (0.00974) 
Waste Management 
per Sibling 2.41e-08***      
 (2.30e-09)      
Same-Industry 
Siblings’ Waste 
Management   7.86e-07***    
   (4.59e-08)    
Same-Industry 
Waste Management 
per Sibling 
    
2.94e-06*** 
 
     
(1.76e-07) 
 County 
Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.00893 0.00376 -0.0106 0.00511 -0.00672 0.00475 
 
(0.0299) (0.00360) (0.0298) (0.00510) (0.0298) (0.00577) 
Penaltiest-1 2.404*** 0.0583*** 2.393*** -0.143*** 2.386*** -0.225*** 
 
(0.0890) (0.0190) (0.0890) (0.0252) (0.0890) (0.0272) 
State LCV Scores -0.000146 
 
-0.000352 
 
-0.000368* 
 
 
(0.000271) 
 
(0.000222) 
 
(0.000210) 
 Firm Ownership 0.683*** 0.0417*** 0.633*** -0.0145 0.658*** -0.041*** 
 
(0.0325) (0.00741) (0.0327) (0.00982) (0.0326) (0.0105) 
Final Goods 0.546 
 
0.517 
 
0.518 
 
 
(2.747) 
 
(2.746) 
 
(2.746) 
 Income per Capita 
(Logged) -0.718*** -0.162*** -0.702*** -0.0973*** -0.695*** -0.0778*** 
 
(0.0770) (0.00903) (0.0761) (0.0128) (0.0759) (0.0145) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.0770*** -0.0030*** -0.0762*** 0.00385*** -0.0762*** 0.00596*** 
 
(0.00828) (0.000991) (0.00823) (0.00140) (0.00822) (0.00159) 
Headquarter 
Location -0.550*** -0.0503*** -0.533*** -0.00526 -0.523*** 0.0167* 
 
(0.0292) (0.00667) (0.0292) (0.00884) (0.0293) (0.00948) 
Constant -1.944 -1.250*** -2.066 -1.182*** -2.115 -0.976** 
 
(1.848) (0.248) (1.844) (0.345) (1.843) (0.386) 
       Observations 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 
R-squared 0.201 0.811 0.201 0.811 0.201 0.812 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported.  
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Table 12: Estimates of Facility‐Level Regulated Emissions and Employment, Robustness Checks 
(1995‐2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
CAA 
Regulated 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
CAA 
Regulated 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
CAA 
Regulated 
Emissions 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
              
CAA Regulated 
Emissions (Logged) 
 
0.0987*** 
 
0.0826*** 
 
0.105*** 
  
(0.00615) 
 
(0.00756) 
 
(0.00740) 
TRI Report 
 
-0.172*** 
 
-0.119*** 
 
-0.176*** 
  
(0.0368) 
 
(0.0452) 
 
(0.0443) 
Salest-1 (per thousand 
dollars, logged) 0.569*** 0.709*** 0.577*** 0.716*** 0.574*** 0.706*** 
 
(0.00782) (0.00218) (0.00781) (0.00250) (0.00782) (0.00249) 
Pollution per Sibling 5.11e-06*** 
     
 
(1.65e-07) 
     Same-Industry 
Siblings’ Pollution   9.79e-07***    
   (3.73e-08)    
Same-Industry 
Pollution per Sibling     3.84e-06***  
     (1.43e-07)  
County 
Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.196*** 0.0250*** -0.203*** 0.0217*** -0.200*** 0.0264*** 
 
(0.0245) (0.00417) (0.0246) (0.00416) (0.0245) (0.00433) 
Penaltiest-1 2.539*** -0.114*** 2.540*** -0.0822*** 2.529*** -0.129*** 
 
(0.0731) (0.0152) (0.0732) (0.0164) (0.0732) (0.0166) 
State LCV Scores -0.0022*** 
 
-0.0023*** 
 
-0.0021*** 
 
 
(0.000211) 
 
(0.000214) 
 
(0.000210) 
 Firm Ownership 0.219*** 0.0319*** 0.219*** 0.0352*** 0.249*** 0.0302*** 
 
(0.0268) (0.00447) (0.0269) (0.00440) (0.0268) (0.00459) 
Final Goods -5.551** 
 
-5.595** 
 
-5.570** 
 
 
(2.432) 
 
(2.434) 
 
(2.434) 
 Income per Capita 
(Log) -1.191*** -0.0595*** -1.178*** -0.0761*** -1.181*** -0.0514*** 
 
(0.0631) (0.0111) (0.0632) (0.0114) (0.0631) (0.0118) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.0805*** 0.00291*** -0.0805*** 0.00195* -0.0813*** 0.00345*** 
 
(0.00679) (0.00112) (0.00680) (0.00110) (0.00679) (0.00115) 
Headquarter Location -0.239*** -0.0308*** -0.305*** -0.0355*** -0.291*** -0.0287*** 
 
(0.0242) (0.00424) (0.0240) (0.00429) (0.0241) (0.00444) 
Constant 12.74*** -2.518*** 12.58*** -2.346*** 12.62*** -2.603*** 
 
(1.518) (0.253) (1.519) (0.250) (1.519) (0.261) 
       Observations 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 173,184 
AIC -118136.3 -118199 -118758.4 
BIC -106793.3 -106846.6 -107387.2 
R-squared 0.217 0.811 0.217 0.811 0.217 0.812 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported 
  50 
Table 13: Estimates of Facility‐Level Regulated Emissions per Unit of Sales and Employment, 
Robustness Checks (1995‐2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Regulated 
Emissions 
per unit of 
Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Regulated 
Emissions 
per unit of 
Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
Regulated 
Emissions 
per unit of 
Sales 
(Logged) 
Employment 
(Logged) 
              
Regulated Emissions 
per unit of Sales 
(Log) 
 
0.464*** 
 
0.302*** 
 
0.472*** 
  
(0.0263) 
 
(0.0238) 
 
(0.0300) 
TRI Report 
 
0.0422*** 
 
0.0701*** 
 
0.0478*** 
  
(0.0162) 
 
(0.0147) 
 
(0.0184) 
Salest-1 (per thousand 
dollars, logged) 
 
0.759*** 
 
0.753*** 
 
0.758*** 
  
(0.00378) 
 
(0.00344) 
 
(0.00426) 
Pollution per Sibling 9.58e-07*** 
     
 
(3.02e-08) 
     Same-Industry 
Siblings’ Pollution   2.43e-07***    
   (6.88e-09)    
Same-Industry 
Pollution per Sibling     7.45e-07***  
     (2.60e-08)  
County 
Nonattainment 
Statust-1 -0.0548*** 0.0335*** -0.0560*** 0.0232*** -0.0556*** 0.0340*** 
 
(0.00452) (0.00446) (0.00452) (0.00416) (0.00452) (0.00459) 
Penaltiest-1 0.335*** -0.058*** 0.335*** -0.00616 0.333*** -0.0612*** 
 
(0.0135) (0.0145) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0151) 
State LCV Scores -0.00057*** 
 
-0.00062*** 
 
-0.00056*** 
 
 
(3.73e-05) 
 
(3.88e-05) 
 
(3.73e-05) 
 Firm Ownership -0.0234*** 0.0571*** -0.0272*** 0.0571*** -0.0177*** 0.0574*** 
 
(0.00490) (0.00456) (0.00490) (0.00428) (0.00489) (0.00462) 
Final Goods -0.204 
 
-0.209 
 
-0.202 
 
 
(0.416) 
 
(0.416) 
 
(0.416) 
 Income per Capita 
(Logged) -0.102*** -0.105*** -0.0963*** -0.126*** -0.0994*** -0.104*** 
 
(0.0116) (0.0105) (0.0116) (0.00989) (0.0116) (0.0107) 
Unemployment  
Ratet-1 -0.00546*** -8.41e-05 -0.00529*** -0.00120 -0.00560*** 3.67e-05 
 
(0.00125) (0.00113) (0.00125) (0.00106) (0.00125) (0.00114) 
Headquarter Location -0.0239*** -0.0399*** -0.0346*** -0.048*** -0.0335*** -0.0396*** 
 
(0.00445) (0.00434) (0.00441) (0.00405) (0.00443) (0.00446) 
Constant 1.348*** -2.201*** 1.306*** -1.895*** 1.331*** -2.212*** 
 
(0.279) (0.263) (0.279) (0.246) (0.279) (0.267) 
       Observations 89,811 89,811 89,811 89,811 89,811 89,811 
R-squared 0.206 0.811 0.206 0.811 0.206 0.812 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry and year effects are included, but not reported. 
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